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Denying the Animosity: Understanding Narratives of Harmony
from the Nellie Massacre, 1983
Jabeen Yasmeen

Indian Institute of Technology
Bombay, Maharashtra, India
Introduction
In early 2019, India geared up for another general election that would decide if the ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi would return to power.1 On
the one hand, supporters of Modi vouched for his charisma and the realization of developments
promised in the campaigns during the last general election in 2014; but on the other, critics
predicted that the threat to the constitutional pillar of secularism may be reinforced with renewed
vigor if the BJP returned to power.2 This fear was based on varied developments in the country
from 2014–2019. One of them was the fear of the disenfranchisement of about four million people
in the state of Assam. The release of the National Register for Citizens (NRC) in Assam had almost
four million names missing from its final draft, which threatened to create the largest potential
cluster of stateless people, a majority of them being Muslims of East Bengal origin.3 In addition, the
Citizenship Amendment Bill of 2016 proposed that citizenship be given to refugees belonging to six
persecuted communities from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, which excluded Muslims.
These both signal the dangerous shifting of India toward the idea of a pro-Hindu right-wing nation.4
The Citizenship Amendment Bill of 2016 was passed into an Act on December 2019, which led to
widespread protests throughout, as well as beyond India;5 these protests were ongoing during the
writing of this paper in 2019/2020. Observers equate the Act’s exclusion of Muslims, along with
the provisions of the NRC as an early stage of genocide.6 It resonates with Gregory H. Stanton’s
identification of the early stages of genocide, which may not be linear.7 The atmosphere of fear
generated during the first term of the BJP government became more tangible during its second
term. As the country shifts towards non-secularism, it is useful to understand how the fracture has
occurred in a nation that has always seemingly been at peace with its multiethnicity and multireligiosity. Was this peace merely on the surface?
Gyanendra Pandey contends in Remembering Partition that in narratives that assert harmony,
“the slippages occur in the very accounts that signal such a mutual constitution and that the
communities are necessarily fragile and open to question.”8 This article tries to understand this
idea of “mutual constitution”9 and fragility through oral narratives from certain periods in recent
Indian history. Doing so makes it possible to reflect on how societies in India adhere to a narrative
of harmony that had existed between different communities before a conflict breaks out, which
denies the existence of any palpable enmity or differences among the communities. This article
1

Joanna Slater and Nisah Masih, “India’s 2019 Elections: What You Need to Know,” The Washington Post, May 22, 2019,
accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/11/indias-elections-what-you-needknow/.

2

Ibid.

3

Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Assam NRC: Over Four Million People Left Off-Draft Since Enforcement of Exercise,
Muslims Majority Among Those Who ‘Fear for Future,’” Firstpost, July 14, 2019, accessed July 15, 2019, https://www.
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further seeks to analyze the “slippages” and see where and how societies are “open to question”
chiefly in the context of the Nellie Massacre of 1983.10 I also refer to two recent forms of violence in
contemporary India, while drawing from the Partition of India in 1947.11 I analyze oral narratives
from Nellie to understand how and why the narrators from a conflict-affected society unfailingly
emphasize a familial structure to refer to their relationship with members of other communities such
as “brothers,” “sisters,” “father-like,” or “mother-like.” In this paper, I argue that, their emphasis
on a familial structure hints at the fact that nations and ethnic communities imagine themselves as
a family despite underlying problems. Does this choosing to remember only the harmony of the
past contribute to a (genocide) denial? If it is indeed denial, does it fuel the conditions for further
genocide in the present, or is it an attempt to mend existing fault lines to achieve a saner society?
Is there any difference between a Hindu, belonging to the majority (Sikhs, in the case of Partition),
asserting peaceful co-existence and a Muslim, belonging to the minority, doing the same? I argue
that there is. While both may stand in a position of geographical constraint due to the sharing of
neighborhoods and may emerge from values of secularism inculcated in them from being part of a
multiethnic society, members of the minority community may also be affected by fear of retaliation
from the majority. This paper is divided into three sections. The first section introduces the Nellie
Massacre of 1983. It considers oral narratives from Nellie, almost thirty-three years after the event
took place. This section underscores how many of the testimonies tend to hold on to a narrative
of harmony, but few refer to the problems that had existed before the conflict. The second section
goes back in time to narratives from the Partition in 1947 and tries to understand how the concepts
of “family” and “brotherhood” is recurrent in these narratives. This section makes it clearer that a
sense of perpetual denial exists in consigning the violence to a suddenness and in not accepting that
it erupted from within the society. The third section returns to the present to analyze the concept
of secularism prevalent in post-Independence India and how this ideal influences the narratives
of harmony along with the reality that communities in mixed societies, such as in India, have to
coexist with one another. This section also leads to the perpetual challenge of Muslim minorities
being seen as the foreigner, which affects narratives in post-conflict societies. These three sections
together imply that although conflict-afflicted societies try to project the picture of a harmonious
family, there are faultlines that exist and require acknowledgment to heal.
Method
This paper chiefly draws upon oral narratives from Nellie as a primary source. They were
collected using a non-probability snowball-sampling methodology over the period of a year,
primarily between March 2016 and September 2016. The names of the respondents from Nellie I
use throughout the paper are fictional. While I stick to a logic of naming the respondents according
to their community and gender affiliations, I choose to use fictitious names so as not to endanger
the respondents who still live in a sensitive society through the use of their real names. This society
still hangs on a delicate balance of harmony, years after the massacre discussed in this paper. In
trying to choose, link, and analyze the narratives, I employ the idea of secularism, as embedded
in post-Independence Nehruvian ideals, to which scholars such as Needham and Sunder Rajan
refer.12 Despite attempts to promote these ideals of secularism in a mixed society such as in India,
fractures in society have led to what Gregory Stanton identifies as the early stages of genocide:
classification, symbolization, discrimination, and organization.13 In trying to understand the oral
narratives from Nellie, I also refer to the scholarship of Gyanendra Pandey, Urvashi Butalia, Dipesh
Chakrabarty, Paul R. Brass, Raheel Dhattiwala and others.14 Lastly, in my discussion of recent
10

Ibid.; the Nellie Massacre may also be referred to as “Nellie” throughout the article.
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Pandey, Remembering Partition, 188.
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Rajeswari Sunder Rajan and Anuradha Dingwaney Needham, “Introduction,” in The Crisis of Secularism in India, ed.
Anuradha Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2009), 1-42.
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Pandey, Remembering Partition, 188; Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India (New Delhi:
Penguin Books, 1998); Paul R. Brass, “The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47: Means,
Methods and Purposes,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (2003), 72, accessed December 20, 2019, doi: https://
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incidents of violence, I draw on secondary sources and, particularly reports from newspapers,
many of which are digital publications. The oral narratives collected from my field research will be
interspersed throughout the paper.
The 1983 Nellie Massacre and All is Well
Nellie is a cluster of approximately sixteen villages in Morigaon in Assam. On February 18, 1983,
Hindu Assamese and indigenous tribal neighbors attacked Nellie killing almost 2,000 people in just
a span of a few hours. The attacked residents primarily belonged to the Bengali-speaking Muslim
community whose predecessors had migrated from former East Bengal, now Bangladesh, from
as early as the 1930s. The attack happened at the peak of the Assam Agitation, a movement that
had sought to oust infiltrators from neighboring Bangladesh.15 Those attacked were perceived as
foreigners. As one of the worst mass-killings in post-Independence India, the Nellie massacre has
not gained much representation in mainstream discourse, or academic, and journalistic or popular
writings despite its scale and political significance. It is debatable whether the Nellie massacre
should be referred to as a massacre and not a genocide. I have observed that although it is referred
to as a massacre it should rather be named a genocide due to the assailants’ intent to wipe out a
certain community.
It was the death of a Parliamentary representative, Hiralal Patowary, in 1979 that became the
immediate context of the Assam Agitation or Assam Movement. During the re-election process that
followed his death, the number of voters increased significantly. The All Assam Students’ Union
(AASU) assumed that that this surge was due to the enlistment of illegal foreigners and demanded
that the elections be rescheduled, and the list be revised.16 Nevertheless, assembly elections were
declared–almost 45,000 enrolled voters were proved to be foreigners. AASU demanded that
voters’ lists for other constituencies also be released.17 Despite prevailing tensions and warnings
from senior police officials, elections were held on February 14 and 17, 1983. The leaders of the
Assam Movement called people to boycott the elections. While most of Assamese society abstained
from voting, a section of the Bengali-speaking Muslim minority voted, which enraged the Assam
Movement leaders.18 The participation in the elections by a section of the Bengali-speaking Muslim
minority is believed to have led to the massacre. Scholars, such as Makiko Kimura, Sanjoy Hazarika,
Monirul Hussain, also cite that the local Lalung (Tiwa) tribe and other scheduled caste19 Hindus
in and around Nellie were provoked to believe that the land abandoned by the Bengali-speaking
Muslims would become theirs after the massacre.20 Most of the land in Nellie and its neighboring
areas had belonged to the Tiwas traditionally but was sold off to the Muslims of East Bengal,
who had started migrating into Assam from as early as the 1930s.21 Makiko Kimura argues in her
book, The Nellie Massacre of 1983: Agency of Rioters, (the lone academic monograph on the Nellie
massacre), that the attackers, which constituted the Tiwas, the Karbis, and the Hindus in the area,
had attacked in self-defense22–it was a particularly troubled time in Assam and rumors were rife that
the Bengali-speaking Muslims were planning to attack the Tiwa village and the Assamese Hindu
villages in the area.23 The locals, both survivors as well as perpetrators, do not assign a historicity
doi.org/10.1080/14623520305657.; Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Remembered Villages: Representations of Hindu-Bengali
Memories in the Aftermath of the Partition,” Economic and Political Weekly 31, no. 32 (1996), 2143, accessed October 4,
2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4404497; Raheel Dhattiwala, Keeping the Peace: Spatial Differences in Hindu-Muslim
Violence in Gujarat in 2002 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
15

Makiko Kimura, The Nellie Massacre of 1983: Agency of Rioters (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2013), 1.

16

Diganta Sharma, Nellie, 1983 (Jorhat: Ekalabya Prakashan, 2007), 6.

17

Ibid.
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Ibid., 7.
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“Scheduled caste” refers to constitutionally recognized groups of people who are considered as lower caste according to
Hindu scriptures and practices.

20

Kimura, The Nellie Massacre of 1983, 101.

21

Ibid., 96.
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to the massacre–they see it as an isolated incident. For them, the cause was more immediate–the
elections and self-defense, respectively.
A tone of fond remembrance can be detected when Abdul Kazi, a Bengali-speaking Muslim
villager from Muladhari in the Nellie area, recalls in an interview with me, how a villager from
the Hindu neighborhood offered to escort him back to his village on a dark night.24 This event was
before the massacre. Kazi remembers how he was often addressed as Bhai or brother on those days
and how his Hindu neighbors worried the roads might not be safe for him to travel at night. They
would give him a torch to help him walk back in the darkness.25
Another Muslim respondent, Riyazuddin, in his late fifties recalled his childhood. As children,
they did not have any sense of being religiously different. He would visit his friend’s house and be
served food by his friend’s mother in their kitchen. Even now, thirty years after the massacre, there
would be exchanges of curries with his Hindu neighbors.26 Despite such bonhomie in the past and
present, the respondent is forced to question the nature of the harmony that had allowed for such
a massacre to happen. The reception of a community, seen as the alien, into the domestic space (in
stark contrast to the society before the Partition, as I discuss later), does not seem to guarantee the
acceptance of their political identity. Nor does it, as a result, guarantee their acceptance into the
social and political space. The simultaneous coexistence of bonhomie and acrimony in a society
can be seen as resembling contradictory behavior. Bradley Campbell points out how an individual
can be both the savior and the perpetrator during a genocide.27 The pre-massacre society of Nellie
seems to reflect this contradictory behavior of being the friendly neighbor as well as the attacker.
While Abdul Kazi and Riyazuddin are members of the survivor community, narratives of the
community of the accused also reference this sentiment of bonhomie. Lovingly called “father” by
all, Mahen Das is a venerated figure for both Hindus and Muslims in the area. While discussing
the long history of migration and settlement of the migrant Bengali speaking Muslim community
in the interior villages of Nellie, he clarifies, “one cannot say Hindu and Muslims to be different
here.”28 He delights in the fact that everyone, irrespective of religion, comes and pays obeisance
to him as a community elder as they also accept that he was indicted as one of the major accused
in the cases that were filed in court. The respondents in the survivors’ villages refer to how this
old man was tied to a pillar in his house when he had tried to protest the massacre, but the old
man never brings it up even in a two-hour long discussion. The survivors prefer to believe that the
venerated fatherly figure had tried to protect them, while the same father figure remains seemingly
oblivious to this myth-making.
A Tiwa man, Ramesh Pator, from the neighborhood reports,
[t]he brotherhood among people is very strong here. There was an all-India Muslim istema
[religious congregation] organized here. We also co-operated in there. […] People from
Upper Assam29 had come. They were expecting the Hindus here to be hostile. They later told
that, when they had to walk such a long distance, had difficulties eating and drinking, all
were resolved. The little differences remaining in the society was dissolved due to the istema.
It was held in 2013.30

As Pator tries to ascertain whether all is well, it slips into his narrative that all might not have been
well: the differences are solved gradually. Despite such deliberate slippages, he prefers to call
the bond a brotherhood, while hinting emphatically at the harmony that had consolidated only
decades after the massacre.31 This claim to brotherhood is contested in the account of the father of
24

Abdul Kazi, interview with author, September 16, 2016.

25

Ibid.

26

Riyazuddin, interview with author, March 10, 2016.

27

Bradley Campbell, “Contradictory Behaviour During Genocides,” Sociological Forum 25, no. 2 (2010), 296-314, accessed
December 22, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40783395.pdf.

28

Mahen Das, interview with author, September 23, 2016.

31

“Brotherhood” is a very gendered term in these narratives. It speaks of a society where male-to-male inter-community
interactions are more prevalent. Bonding amongst women of the two communities in Nellie was not referenced
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a person who had dropped out of school due to bullying from the children of other communities.
This event was during another phase of violence which happened in the state in the early 2000s
against the Bengali-speaking Muslim community. He says,
[d]uring that time, these children could not study in peace. They were threatened that they
will be cut into pieces. “Do not come to school.” The teachers were given complaints. He
would come to me and say, “Father, how do we go to school?” They would pull his hair, pull
his clothes from behind, pinch him. They would hit from behind if he sits in the front, take
away his pen or copy. He would come and tell us; we would ask him to go to the teacher
since we know no one else. Even if the teacher would scold them, it continued. So, my son
stopped going to school.32

This account seems to reiterate an oft-heard statement of children who have been bullied at school:
“children are cruel.” Such cruelty may be what children bring and emulate from their elders, their
family, and society in general. Bullying may be a situation where the filtered narratives of harmony
slipped to reveal how the children are conditioned to perceive and treat someone from a different
community. The violence underlying this bullying is a replay of the violence of the Nellie massacre.
Both communities must have passed down the memory of the massacre to younger generations.
Such threats of violence, likely bullying, indicate how society continues to recover years after the
conclusion of violence.
Friction in the pre-conflict society is referred to again when a local tribal (Tiwa) leader
remembers the social conditions right before the massacre.
These people [Bengali-speaking Muslims] started creating nuisance in our villages around.
Nobody would have cows in their shed, they would be stolen. They would steal in people’s
houses too, putting the people in trouble. We had our fields where the people were settled.
When the paddy would be ripe for harvest, they would reap them off at night. There were
some troubles and then Assam Agitation also came in. As far as I know, our people were not
very willing to participate in it but, there were instigations of Assam Agitation as well as
some influence of the RSS. So, the incident of February 18, 1983 happened.33

This local leader’s version comes dangerously close to denial by blaming the victim community for
what happened. He makes it certain that he does not intend to incriminate the Assamese Muslims
with whom he shares a very cordial relationship when he refers to them as those “whom we even
address as uncles, my father’s friends and all.”34 As one of the leaders of the communities, he
seems to be well aware of the fact that his version has to be balanced. He does not want to negate
the differences that existed in the pre-conflict society, but he is careful not to implicate his own
community.
Most of the narratives from Nellie prefer to remember a society in which the neighboring
communities coexisted peacefully. Even though they try to conform to the practice of brotherhood
and harmony, their narratives complicate the picture of idealistic coexistence. In doing so,
sometimes one becomes close to denial by blaming the victims for the problems that led to the
attack. When the narrators of both the communities accept that there were, and still are, problems
existing within the communities, they tend to indicate an awareness of the possible reasons of
animosity and a willingness to prevent it in the future. When they prefer to characterize a society
as like a family–brothers, uncles, and fathers–they repeat what is common in many post-genocide
survivor narratives: they deny the root cause of the conflict, hence denying the event itself.
This pattern of denial of the problem through re-enacting familial bonds with members of the
other community as “uncles,” “father,” and “brothers” is an attempt to rearrange the society in a
during the interviews.
32

Muslim Man 2, interview with author, September 16, 2016.

33

Tribal Leader, interview with author, September 24, 2016.

34

Ibid.
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familial structure while also trying to normalize any conflict because families do have everyday
minor conflicts. The “rhetoric of family” serves as a “discursory anchor for a host of non-familial
references,” observes Leslie J. Miller.35 According to Miller, the “ideal of the harmonious domestic
or ‘bourgeois’ family is among the sturdiest set pieces in the modern cultural repertoire,” and we
are “overwhelmingly committed to upholding a unified and harmonious image of family life.”36
The idea of a family, thereby, is an image to be “upheld” to the outer eye. What goes on inside may
be different from what meets the eye, but the surface has to appear harmonious. The recurring
pattern of being a family in a community afflicted by violence therefore may be a façade and thus
a denial.
The Partition, 1947, “Brotherhood,” and Denial
The denial of violence within and the consignment of violence to the outside is a recurrent pattern
in Partition narratives, as Gyanendra Pandey observes.37 This denial occurs with standard stories
of exceptional peace and harmony. Such denial is repeated in most of the narratives where the
societies fail to address what Pandey remarks as “disorders that is somehow a part of our history
too.”38 In 1947, British India was divided into India, and East and West Pakistan.39 Along with
a mass exodus, this division, known as the Partition, also led to an episode of unprecedented
violence and bloodshed when the communities–Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims–killed, maimed, and
raped individuals of the other communities.40 Paul R. Brass considers the Partition a retributive
genocide.41 The “genocidal massacres” during the Partition were not ordered by the state nor were
they unorganized and spontaneous.42 The violence between the communities was mutual.43 If one
considers the Partition a genocide, even though the violence lacked “genocidal intent,” hearing
survivors mostly choosing to remember a society that was harmonious right before the Partition
becomes increasingly intriguing.44
Urvashi Butalia’s book, The Other Side of Silence, recounts many such narratives where the
survivors, regardless of their community, remember the “brotherhood” that existed right before the
violence of Partition took over. Butalia cites an interview from Satti Khanna and Peter Chappell’s
film on the Partition, A Division of Hearts (1987).45 Murad was a child in Lahore when the Partition
happened. He recounts,
[i]n the past Hindus and Muslims lived like brothers, and looked after each other. Even a
big landlord would offer all kinds of help when a poor menial worker was getting married.
[...] There was a lot of fellow feeling. But when Partition took place, everything got turned
upside down. They pierced even infants with their spears […] they started hating each other.
There was such harmony before this.46

Murad’s narrative continues to emphasize that there was a strong camaraderie and brotherhood
amongst the communities before the Partition violence. Despite referring to the monstrosity of
infants being “pierced”, Murad’s narrative returns to underscore that “there was such harmony
before this.”47 Along with the violence of the Partition, Murad also chooses to remember a society
35

Leslie J. Miller, “Violent Families and the Rhetoric of Harmony,” The British Journal of Sociology 41, no. 2 (1990), 265,
accessed May 6, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/590873.

36

Ibid., 263-264.

37

Pandey, Remembering Partition, 188.

38

Ibid., 174.

39

Gyanendra Pandey, Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 133

40

Brass, The Partition of India, 76.

41

Ibid., 72.

42

Ibid.

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid.

45

Satti Khanna and Peter Chappell, dirs., A Division of Hearts (New York: Icarus Films, 1987), 57 minutes.

46

Butalia, The Other Side of Silence, 294.

47

Ibid.
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where there was no conflict, thus choosing to overlook that there might have been already existing
tensions brewing in pre-Independence India that led the way to the Partition. Even if one discounts
Murad’s narrative as the recollections of an adult who was a child then, there are other narratives
which came from an adult during the Partition, such as Basant Kaur. Although she speaks of the
violence inflicted during the Partition, she also remembers how different communities had lived
in close geographical proximity and attended functions with each other’s families–“in our village
there were a few Musalmaan [Muslim] families, but we never had any problem. We lived together,
there were marriages, we would attend them, we lived fairly close to each other. Close by there were
other villages where you would find Musalmaans, Tihai, Saintha, Sadiok, Sadda, small villages.”48
Bir Bahadur Singh, Basant Kaur’s son, also references social proximity in his account, but
his narrative gradually addresses what Kaur had preferred to gloss over— the underlying
discrimination in the narratives of harmony. Singh starts with how the Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs
were a close community with frequent social and economic exchanges. Despite this relationship,
there were instances when the Hindus treated the Muslims differently. This was most evident in
the exchange of food between the Hindus and Sikhs and the Muslims. The Muslims would have to
offer uncooked food to the Hindus and Sikhs when the latter would visit them during any function
or otherwise, because the Hindus and Sikhs would not eat food cooked in a Muslim house or with
a utensil used by a Muslim. Singh remembers, “you see we used to drink milk from their houses,
but the milk had to be in an unused utensil, a new one.”49 He further elaborates that if the Muslims
were served food in a Hindu or Sikh house, the bread would be thrown to their plates, so the server
does not become polluted. Such differential treatment can be equated with untouchability and
caste-violence, as posited by Kalpana Kannabiran.50 Singh’s account is filled with similar instances
of such treatment meted out to the Muslims, which he believes was the reason for Partition. His
narrative fractures the notion of brotherhood and camaraderie as superfluous and opportunistic:
“they would call our mothers and sisters didi [sisters], they would refer to us as brothers, sisters,
fathers, and when we needed them they were always there to help, yet when they came to our
houses, we treated them so badly.”51 An interviewee in Ritu Menon and Kamala Bhasin’s work
Borders and Boundaries says, “we neither broke bread with them, nor inter-married, but the rest was
fine.”52 Although the Hindu woman must have intended to underline “the rest” where everything
was fine, her narrative ends up highlighting the differences and hierarchies–the communities did
not have relations that were cordial enough to inter-dine or inter-marry. They were not equal or
similar enough. Menon and Bhasin remark that forgetting “deep seated prejudices and taboos”
and “deep affection and amity” existed alongside each other is easy.53 Such narratives of a prePartition society try to adhere to the idea that all was well in the society. The killings and rapes
were seen and projected as a sudden rupture in their peaceful everyday life. Such narratives tend
to overlook that fault-lines can be mended only if they are recognized. A genocidal event such as
the Partition could not have taken place, if all had lived harmoniously side by side. Although the
Partition had left a deep sense of resentment, it simultaneously evoked a “considerable sense of
nostalgia.”54 Pandey observes that it is often referred to as the “partition of siblings.”55 Clinging to
such nostalgia, communities choose to overlook the bitter fact that the Partition was meant to be a
solution to “the ‘Muslim’ answer to ‘Hindu Oppression’ and ‘Hindu Capitalism.’”56
The repeated evocation of brotherhood (or similar familial relations) is a convenient
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euphemism to express one’s obliviousness to the reality of the situation. Certain narratives of
the 1971 Bangladeshi war also resorted to such a tool. Yasmin Saikia interviewed Pakistani army
men who had been involved in the war, for her book Women, War and the Making of Bangladesh:
Remembering 1971. She found that the rhetoric of the Bangladeshis as brothers occupied the same
space as them being “betrayers.”57 Saikia often encountered an explanation as to why the war had
happened–“the Indians had infiltrated and manipulated the Bengalis.”58 The revolt of the Bengali
officers in the East Bengal Regiment in March 1971 still perplexes the Pakistani Military academy–
they still refer to the revolt as “Brothers killing Brothers.”59 Pakistan was territorially divided into
East and West Pakistan. Punjabis dominated the west while Bengalis constituted the majority in the
east. The Punjabi factor slowly established its prominence in Pakistan’s identity and politics with
the support of the Urdu-speaking immigrants from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The state increasingly
began to favor the Urdu-speaking groups in West Pakistan with inequitable distribution of wealth
between the East and West, economic exploitation, restrictions on Bengali speech in public sphere,
and lack of political representation in the country’s national parliament.60 These political and social
realities were sidelined when the Pakistani army men still tried to grasp why and how the war had
happened. Reference to their brotherhood and explaining the war as a result of India’s interference
seems to obliterate the “physical, emotional, political and cultural” divisions that had seeped into
the two divisions of Pakistan.61
Similar denial of violence in pre-genocide societies by post-genocide narratives such as in
Nellie and after the Partition may be illustrated with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s explanation of the
tussle between nostalgia, trauma, and history. Chakrabarty explains in the context of survivors
of Partition in the east, viz. Bengal, that “a traumatized memory has a narrative structure which
works on a principle opposite to that of any historic narrative,” and the memory has to “place the
[e]vent within a shared mythic construction of the past that gives force to the claim of the victim.”62
Chakrabarty refers to a collection of essays called Chere Asha Gram (The Abandoned Village). The
essays were written with a sense of tragedy where the Partition is “an inexplicable event” for the
survivors.63 They express a sense of “stunned disbelief” at the Partition.64 A running theme in this
book reads, “how inexplicable it all was—neighbours turned against neighbours after years of
living together in bonds of intimacy and affection, friends took up arms against friends. How did
this come to pass?”65 Chakrabarty argues that the difference between history and memory is that
“history seeks to explain the event, the memory of pain refuses the historical explanation and sees
the event causing the pain as a monstrously irrational aberration.”66 Genocides and events of conflict
in mixed societies thus become “irrational aberration” that cannot be explained by history.67 The
members of the majority community may want to believe that the aberration was unaccountable,
notwithstanding the overt or subvert subjugation that they might have subjected the minorities
to. Chakrabarty points out how secular meant the members of the minority community had to
adapt the ways of the majority, not the other way around. Such subtle coercions in a mixed society
indicate how the idea of secular can become narrow and less accommodating.
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Secularism, Coexistence, and the “Foreigner”
In post-Independence India, the idea of secularism can be attributed to Jawaharlal Nehru.68 Syed
Mufti observed that “the ideal of the new Indian nation for Nehru was based on a non-identitarian
‘Indian-ness’ which would bear (only) the marks of modern citizenship.”69 Such secularism
was difficult to implement in a country where even the ideologies of the leaders of the “official
nationalism” before independence was predominantly Hindu, such that “the terms of national
self-identifications tended to privilege Hindu identifications over those of other communities.”70
Hindu-Muslim conflicts were not uncommon in pre-Independence India. One of the first
Hindu-Muslim conflict recorded was in 1859, when Hindus had taken out processions which
passed mosques during the time of prayer. Ganapati (Ganesh of the Hindu pantheon) festivals had
become a medium to realign the idea of an Indian with that of a Hindu.71 It was the beginning of
the formulation and absorption of the extreme Hinduism ideals. The census taken by the British
administration further strengthened the “self-awareness of numerical strength and territorial
reach objectifying Hindu-Muslim consciousness.”72 When the Hindu political parties in the
1980s rose into power, a notable section of the majority in post-Independence India had begun to
believe in this “homogenous Hindu identity and culture as coterminous with the nation, India.”73
They all clamored to achieve Gandhi’s vision of a Ramrajya, an ideal state under Lord Ram, the
incarnation of Lord Vishnu, the Hindu god, ignited by a national imagination where “Muslims
and Christians remain foreigners and outsiders until such time as they give up their religious
difference.”74 India had become a nation where the majority Hindu perceived minority rights as an
“appeasement” of the minority rather than as an attempt to ensure protection of all religions in “a
hugely heterogenous nation.”75 The political mobilization of the Hindus in the name of achieving
Ramrajya was cunningly, as well as ironically, rooted in the idea of the equalitarian Ramrajya
envisioned by Gandhi. Gandhi’s usage of the term to propagate the dream of a secular, peaceful,
and efficient nation has been appropriated by the hate politics of post-Independence India to arrive
on December 6, 1992 at the demolition of Babri Masjid (Mosque), which allegedly stood in the place
of a Ram temple and also led to the flaring up of the communal riots soon after in several parts
of the country. Observing such recurring violence in post-independence India, I would posit that
implementation of secularism in India is almost an unattainable utopia–complicated and asserted
further by recurrent incidents of communal violence. It is within such parameters of secularism
that narrators recounting incidents of communal violence, such as the Nellie massacre, can be
understood. It is the ideal of coexistence that a mixed society is expected to follow, which makes
the narrators fall back on the narratives of harmony, relegating the fault-lines behind it.
Raheel Dhattiwala explains how neighboring practices in mixed societies affect occurrences
and narratives of violence. In her book, Keeping the Peace, aptly subtitled Spatial Differences in HinduMuslim Violence in Gujarat in 2002, Dhattiwala refers to the Hindu-Muslim equation in Ahmedabad,
a city in Gujarat. In contemporary India, Gujarat witnessed one of the worst incidents of violence
(or rather, pogrom), namely the Godhra riots.76 Dhattiwala investigates two neighborhoods in
Ahmedabad in Gujarat. One, Ram Rahim Nagar, remained unaffected by the riots in the city in
2002, and the other, Santoshnagar, adjacent to Ram Rahim Nagar, witnessed casualties. Dhattiwala
finds that there might be “ethnic resentment” between the two communities, but in Ram Rahim
Nagar harmony prevailed due to the local leadership. Violence was put in check through “informal
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monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.”77 In some scenarios, victims and perpetrators are forced
to live as neighbors because they cannot go anywhere else.78 In riot-prone cities in Gujarat, The
Disturbed Areas Act, 1986, “forbids the exchange of property between Hindus and Muslims to
prevent distress selling.”79 Living in close proximity is not a choice for many. Dhattiwala concludes
that people in conflict affected societies learn to maintain “superficial relations” with their
neighbors, even when they do not trust one another.80 Even if the 1986 Disturbed Areas Act does
not apply to Nellie, the compulsion of coexistence does influence the narration of harmony—the
survivors cannot leave Nellie (or their homes) after the massacre.
In Nellie, the villages of the Bengali-speaking Muslims are surrounded by the Assamese
Hindu and tribal villages. Many narrators would reflect that they have a single road via the Hindu
villages to connect themselves to the outer world. If they were to express their grief and anger,
they imagine that it would inevitably put them in a geographically vulnerable position. At the
same time, the Hindu and tribal attackers also realize that they have to coexist with their Muslim
neighbors, and they constantly remind themselves of the brotherhood that exists amongst them.81
The idea of coexistence reinforces the narrative of peace. Narratives of survivors, when they
recollect the peaceful times and familial affinity before an event of conflict, may be speaking out
from different positions, which may include fear of retaliation, being ostracized, or revoking and
thereby encouraging further violence. Taking an optimistic view, one can also consider this as a
holding on to the values of humanism and secularism, however idealistic they might be, inculcated
during the conception of the nation by early leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi.
Two recent stories elaborate on how narratives of violence and denial of animosity are affected
by spaces of coexistence. On March 27, 2018, Asansol, a town in the Indian state of West Bengal,
erupted into violence over a Ram Navami procession (a Hindu festival that marks the birth of Lord
Ram).82 Three people were killed. A year after the riots, a report cites the residents of Sinthla Dangal
and the adjoining Ram Krishna Dangal, a Hindu-majority pocket involved in the riots, claiming
that all is well after the riots of March 2018. However, the reporter senses that “there might not be
any surface tension but a strong undercurrent is palpable.”83 This undercurrent is hidden in the
story of Sandeep Raut, who lost his mother during the riots and asserts that the Bihari (referring to
the Hindus) population will not attend the public meeting of West Bengal chief minister, Mamata
Banerjee, who is accused of being pro-Muslim.84
Contrary to what is seen as an “undercurrent,” the riots in Asansol were in the news due to
the exemplary act of a Muslim cleric, Imam Imdadul Rashidi, who lost his sixteen-year old son,
Shibghatullah Rashidi, in the riots. When the riots broke out, Shibghatullah was studying in the
nearby Madrassa (Muslim religious school). He rushed out for the safety of home but ended up
entering the Hindu colony. Imam Rashidi was informed by the authorities near midnight that a
“mutilated body of a teenaged boy” was found that could be his son.85 The Imam requested that
the news not be made public, believing “if people get to know, hot-headed boys will attack the
Hindus in the darkness.”86 When an estimated 10,000 people gathered for the burial later that day,
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the crowd was angry and baying for revenge. Imam Rashidi pleaded to the crowd, “if you love me
then I ask from you at this moment only one promise. That with your tongue or with your hand,
none of you will cause any harm to any Hindu.”87 Another report quotes him saying, “if you love
me then don’t indulge in any violence and let peace prevail. I don’t want any more lives to be lost.
If you resort to any violence, then I will leave the mosque and the city.”88 His address placated
the crowd in such a way that Muslim boys from the neighborhood took turns guarding the few
Hindu properties in the Muslim-populated area of Raniganj, where the incident happened. Imam
Rashidi’s plea for peace came to be heralded as heroic. He had even refused to name his son’s
killers. His act is said to have saved Asansol, or possibly India, from another bloodbath.89
Reports on Imam Rashidi simultaneously reminded one of a similar act of refusal to be involved
in the web of violence by Yashpal Saxena, father of Ankit Saxena, a Hindu boy from Delhi, who was
murdered by the relatives of his Muslim girlfriend right in front of his parents.90 Despite political
pressures from some right-wing parties to turn it into a cause for riots, Yashpal Saxena refused to
blame the entire Muslim community for the crime of a few. In a few months, Yashpal Saxena went
on to organize Iftar, the event when Muslims break their fast during the holy month of Ramadan,
as a call for peace and brotherhood.91
Both Rashidi and Saxena have been hailed as heroes who mitigated what could have turned
into larger events of violence. Rashidi and Saxena called for peace in their cities: no other family
should suffer what their families have. Saxena says that Ankit had friends from all religions, and
he would frequently visit all places of worship. These were values instilled in his upbringing.
Asansol, the city where Rashidi lives, has the phrase “City of Brotherhood” written over the gate
that stands at its entrance.92 This narrative of harmonious dwelling and brotherhood incongruously
exists amidst the incidents of violence. The idea of a secular nation still holds strong throughout
these narratives despite the bitterness experienced by the various affected communities. But, what
does peace mean in such settings? As both fathers call for peace in the society and requests not to
politicize the deaths of their sons, can we find a difference between their emphasis on unity and
forgiveness based on the communities they belong to? Are their positions different because one
belongs to the minority while the other belongs to the majority? Rashidi’s plea could have been
based on the genuine gesture of forgiveness or on a canny calculation of fear as a minority. The
insistence on peace finds a place even when they would want justice to be implemented. Both
the fathers say that they would want justice for their sons’ deaths while remaining unwilling to
incriminate the other community.93
Amidst such mobilization toward peace, a minute crack exists in the narrative. Despite being
hailed as a national hero, in an interview with Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), Rashidi speaks of
how certain people question his citizenship.94 They accuse him of being a Bangladeshi. In response,
Rashidi has to emphasize that his forefathers were freedom fighters during India’s struggle for
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freedom, and he loves his country because it is in his blood. Saxena, on the other hand, never
had to address this question of belonging, even when he challenges the Hindu-right wing heavyweights by refusing to toe their line. The Hindu-right may see him as a betrayer or a coward, but
his identity and his right to belong in the nation are never questioned. The ideas of secularism are
exhausted when Rashidi’s act of forgiveness quickly transforms into a challenge to his citizenship.
He has to invoke his ancestral identity and his lineage, as well as right to belong. Being a member
of the Muslim minority, Rashidi has to be ready to defend his identity as an Indian. For a Muslim,
the threat of being denounced as the outsider who does not belong is omnipresent.95
In a society torn by violence, when narrators assert the presence of harmony, their assertions
may sound similar, but such declarations may arise from different origins. For a member of the
Muslim minority, these statements of harmony may be based out of fear of retaliation simply by
being the minority, and at other times, to claim their belonging. As Dipesh Chakrabarty said, the
minority has to adapt to the ways of the majority to appear secular.96 For a member of the Hindu
majority, this might not be the case. For a Muslim, it might be an attempt to not be reminded,
to not remind others, or to not be ostracized as a foreign invader who lingered for too long. The
perception of the Muslim as the foreign invader has become deep-rooted in places such as Gujarat.
The Gujarati Hindu majority has pathologically imbibed the perception of the Muslim as the
foreign invader throughout the centuries. Dhattiwala cites Gujarati linguist and author Ganesh
Devy, who says, “there is only the deep, almost genetic, knowledge of Somnath and the invasions
and an accumulation of prejudices.”97 Thus, it becomes a given in Gujarat that Muslims are still the
invaders who do not belong.
The pattern of not belonging is reiterated in the narratives from Nellie, when Riyazuddin
remembers the years of the Assam Agitation.98 The processions during this period would have
slogans such as, “Mukhe daari haate paan/Chalo Miyan Pakistan” (Beard around the chin and betelleaves in hand/Miyan, let us send you to Pakistan).99 Miyan is a term of reverence in Urdu but
has come to derogatorily mean the Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam, especially those whose
ancestors had migrated from the district of Mymensingh in Bangladesh.100 In the Hindu-right
narrative, Pakistan is often evoked as the space where Muslims rightfully belong.101 Although the
Assam Agitation was not explicitly communal, Hindu-right ideas gradually influenced it as the
Rashitriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) penetrated it. The Nellie massacre is believed to be an outcome
of the provocative speeches of the Hindu right, as well as extremist Muslim leaders.102 In the
documentary film What the Fields Remember, 103 a survivor remembers how his little daughter was
killed in the massacre. A day earlier, she had joined one of the processions of the Assam Agitation
with placards that said, “foreigners go away.” In the heart-breaking moment when she lay dying,
after the attack the next day, she asked her father, “Are we the foreigners, then?” The stoic father
today remembers how the little girl did not realize who was considered the foreigner and why.104
Despite being of such political importance, the little girl’s death went unaccounted for.
The killings of Nellie massacre were hushed in the public memory. Of the 688 cases filed, the
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police submitted charge-sheets for 310 cases.105 When the Assam Accord was signed in 1985,106
the perpetrators were given total impunity, a major aspect that indicates denial. The state fails to
acknowledge the wrong done. The state is perpetually nervous to permit dialogue regarding the
massacre. In an interview with journalist Diganta Sharma, who wrote a very informative book on
the massacre, I was told how Makiko Kimura’s talk at a reputed institute in Assam was canceled
thirty minutes before the scheduled time.107 Kimura reports in her book that police had asked
her not to visit Nellie for research without them accompanying her.108 The state’s precautions are
further accentuated by facts such as that the Tiwari Commission report on the massacre was never
publicly released. Commission reports on violence in India often face this fate: Jaganmohan Reddy
Commission of Inquiry on the Gujarat riots of 1969, judicial inquiry by S.B. Bhansle after the Worli
riots in 1974 in Mumbai, Justice Saxena Commission report on the 1980 Moradabad Riots, inquiry
commission after Bhagalpur riots in 1989, Justice B.N. Srikrishna Commission report on Mumbai
riots 1992-93 are a few of the reports that have not been given due attention.109 The refusal to permit
discussions around such instances of violence is also a negation of the possibility to address the
differences in the society and thereby a denial of the responsibility to hold the guilty accountable.
Such caution is especially employed when the guilty is a majority. The refusal to attend to reports
of the several commissions over the period of time has not diminished the possibility of recurring
violence. Does the state really deny the existence of fault-lines, or is it the bias inherent in the state
controlled by the majority? Such silences by the state influence the narrators’ position and ability
to speak in the aftermath of violence; the minority becomes conscious of possible retaliation, while
the Hindu majority, though, can be sensitive toward the conflict situation, can also bask in a statepropagated idea of immunity.
The confidence provided by having a state-supported appearance of having immunity,
especially when a person belongs to the majority, was evident during the anti-Sikh riots of 1984.
On October 31, 1984, when the prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated by two
Sikh security guards, a three-day pogrom ensued. Sikhs were hunted down throughout Delhi in a
series of planned attacks, mostly by Hindu mobs, supervised by Congress (I),110 the political party
in power.111 It was primarily neighbors and other locals involved in the attack, but the survivors
feared further attacks if they pointed them out. The survivors, however, did not hesitate to “freely
and unjustifiably” blame the Dalits and Muslims.112 That the survivors were scared of implicating
the Hindu perpetrators seem understandable, given that the latter had a certain protection from the
state. The threat of having to share space as neighbors in the future also triggered the fear. In contrast,
incriminating the Muslims and the Dalits, who had no participation in the attack, is noteworthy.
As marginalized communities, the Muslims and the Dalits were vulnerable and definitely had
no state protection. Implicating them seemed to be the next possible thing to attaining justice by
the Sikhs, who were considered a part of the Hindu majority before the anti-Sikh riots. The fear
of the majority Hindu in power and in the neighborhoods, along with the callousness toward
the minorities influenced the survivor narratives. Thus, narratives of survivors and perpetrators
emerge from different places of securities and insecurities, which leads to the determination on
whether these narratives will reflect the discord or the patterns of harmony and brotherhood.
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The insecurity that accompanies being the vulnerable and lesser minority and belonging to
the community perceived as the foreigner who needs to be ousted shaped the narratives of the
survivors of the Nellie massacre. This fear is renewed and further affirmed during the updating
of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam. NRC was prepared for the first time under
a directive of the Ministry of Home Affairs during the Census of 1951. The census documents
containing information on the relevant particulars of every person enumerated were copied in
registers. In 2013, the process of updating the NRC had begun in Assam. Citizens had to prove
their family-tree and their connection to a legacy data, a number that had been given during the
NRC of 1951. The first draft of the updated NRC was released on December 31, 2017 and the
complete draft on July 3, 2018. The complete draft left out nearly four million people, creating a
potential pool of the world’s largest stateless population. The final draft released on August 31,
2019 finally left out almost 1.9 million applicants.113
The threat of religion-based citizenship in India goes against the very foundational ideas of
secularism that Nehru had envisioned, “a non-identitarian ‘Indian-ness’ which would bear (only)
the marks of modern citizenship,” as embedded in the Constitution of India.114 The Citizenship
Amendment Act, 2020 (CAA) became a major instrument in asserting “the homogenous Hindu
identity and culture as coterminous with the nation, India.”115 CAA indicates that India has entered
an early stage of genocide.116 Genocide Watch marks India as having reached stage five of genocide,
i.e., organization, when the state uses militias, formal or informal, to provide deniability of state
responsibility, organizes police to spy, arrest, torture, and murder people suspected of opposing
the dominant leaders, and motivating to target the religious majority, namely the Hindus, through
mass media.117 Due to the CAA along with the NRC, India is simultaneously undergoing several
stages of genocide—classification: distinguishing people by religion; symbolization: distinguishing
the target group by dress and appearance; and discrimination: a dominant group using laws to
deny rights to other groups.118 The NRC becomes the instrument of classification of “the alien”
by their religion and descent, and together with the CAA of 2019, it has the potential to become
an instrument of discrimination by taking away citizenship rights. Along with classification and
discrimination, symbolization and polarization can also be seen as conspicuously present in
today’s India.
When I began my field visits in Nellie in early 2016, the process of applying to be included in
the NRC had just begun. Many individuals, even those who were well-educated, were struggling
to understand the different clauses and requirements of the application process. In Nellie, most of
the people are not very literate. There were bound to be confused about the application process
and the paperwork involved, anomalies were thus inevitable. In the interviews during the early
phase of my research, there were scattered references to the process and how it has made them
fearful of being underlined as the foreigner, even if they have all the proper documents. For them,
the process of applying to be included in the NRC list was a repetition of the rigorous process of
which they had to endure in order to prove their citizenship when they were declared a doubtful
voter (D-Voter)–individuals who were classified as D-voters would be discredited as citizens and
have their voting rights challenged. Nevertheless, they also welcomed the decision to update the
database of citizens, since doing so would prove that they were not foreigners but rather rightful
citizens. In subsequent years as I visited them, the community became more careful in discussing
the massacre and the documents they might or might not have. While traveling in public auto113
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rickshaws crowded with other passengers, I would overhear how someone’s daughter had to
rush to her parental home in Nellie for verification of documents, and other similar instances.
Toward the end of my research period by 2019, people were cautious with their responses during
interviews; they were suspicious, and they vocalized their suspicion, too. The interviewees in later
stages were dismissive of the question of whether all was or has been well.
The missing names in the NRC list becomes a threat to the Muslim community when seen
together with the CAA of 2019, which has provisions to bestow citizenship upon people of six
communities, namely Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Christians, Jains and Buddhists, from Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Afghanistan.119 If we read the NRC together with the provisions of the CAA, it
becomes logically comprehensible that the Hindu-Bengali community may or may not make a
large share of those left out of the NRC list, but if they indeed are left out, they might be able
to reapply for citizenship, even without any documents. Similarly, it can be understood that the
Bengali-speaking Muslims, left out of the NRC can be deprived of their citizenship, if the NRC
and CAA are read together. The Bengali-speaking Muslim community has become more wary of
being at the receiving end yet again. Over the years, the Nellie massacre had become a metonymy
for all the injustices meted out to them. Although the media has repeatedly evoked the massacre
as a significant political moment for the community, the community remained tight-lipped. A
gradual polarization in the discourse has emerged over the years. For instance, individual artists
have made music videos replete with hate-inducing images and songs that threaten foreigners
with dire consequences. Although a song occasionally evokes the concept of “Hindu-Muslim
Bhai Bhai,” i.e., Hindus and Muslims are brothers, it simultaneously falls back on the image of the
Bengali-speaking Muslim as the infiltrator who needs to be killed and not merely chased away
or deported.120 In the backdrop of such changing political and social dynamics, the narrative in
Nellie becomes even more cautious—a society once seared by such large-scale violence cannot be
immune to the prospect of its repetition.
Conclusion
The various narratives of survivors and perpetrators of various violent events in India prove that
violence afflicted societies are situated on a fragile balance. This fragility is revealed in the caution
the narrators exercise in their narratives, whether they be narratives from the Partition, the Gujarat
Pogrom, or the Nellie Massacre. The narratives from these events can be seen as representative
of the numerous other events of violence and the societies and communities that evolve after the
occurrence of such events. These narratives emerge from various positions of the narrators. When
a narrator acknowledges the fault-lines that exist or might have existed before the event to the
interviewer, most often an outsider, the narrators express an understanding that recognizing the
differences is an important step towards preventing similar occurrences of violence in the future. In
contrast, when the narrators try to hold on to narratives of harmony from the past– often grasping
on to the image of a family and presenting the events as normal family skirmishes– they may be
trying to assuage violence in the present or prevent violence in the future. Besides the fact that
it may be a willful overlooking of the reality, such narratives of harmony can also emerge from
various political and social locations of the narrators
On the one hand, assuming that both communities are sincere in their assertion of a harmonious
past in their narration is judicious, their claim to brotherhood may indeed be true. However, the
narrator, belonging to the politically dominant majority, also speaks from a position of security.
Although they might fear that the opposing communities may attack them, they are mostly secure
in the knowledge that they are the numerically stronger community. They may be aware of the
restrictions of geography in a mixed society, but they know they will have more power to retaliate
in case of any unforeseen incident.
On the other hand, the minority community does not have numbers in their favor, which they
know. Their narratives of harmony may originate from a point of fear of numbers. Similar to the
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majority, they are sensitive to the realities and vulnerabilities of coexisting and the challenges that
could stem from communal conflict. As the minority, the Muslims in India, and particularly the
Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam, have to constantly encounter challenges with regards to their
identity, their right as citizens, and the slur of being foreigners. Many times, conflicts arise out of
this challenge itself. When the narrators speak in a post-conflict society, they are mindful of these
environments in which they stand. Although the positions from which they speak may justify their
narratives, not addressing the reality of the fragility and the existing differences will only further
deepen the divide.
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